Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we show that individuals, in particular women and ethnic minorities, are highly heterogeneous in their expectations of infl ation. We estimate a model of infl ation expectations based on learning from experience that also allows for heterogeneity in both private information and updating. Our model vastly outperforms existing models of infl ation expectations in explaining the heterogeneity in the data. We fi nd that women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their private information, and are also slower to update their expectations. In addition, we show that personal income forecasts are positively related to subjective infl ation expectations. During the 2000s, consumers believe infl ation to be more persistent in the short term, but temporary fl uctuations in infl ation have less effect on income and long-term infl ation expectations. Finally, we fi nd evidence that sticky expectations and the heterogeneity of new information received by consumers generate higher mark-ups and infl ation.
Introduction
In ‡ation expectations of agents are the main focus of modern macroeconomic models as well as monetary policy (Sims, 2009 ). Today, several surveys collect direct measures of in ‡ation expectations of consumers, professional forecasters and experts. 1 However, controlling in ‡ation expectations requires one to understand how they are formed. Interpretation of the data and policy outcomes is greatly a¤ected by whether models assume rational expectations (Lucas, 1972) or some sort of bounded rationality (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Carroll, 2003; Branch, 2004 Branch, , 2007 . For instance, the e¤ects of monetary policy can be less powerful when agents doubt the commitment of central banks to …ght future in ‡ation (Orphanides and Williams, 2003) . More recently, macroeconomic studies that use time series of median expectations such as Roberts (1997) , Adam and Padula (2011) and Eusepi and Del Negro (2011) …nd that sticky prices are explained by non-rationalities in price expectations. Survey work has shown that individuals are not fully informed about future outcomes, and that there is substantial divergence among individuals'beliefs (Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers, 2003) . There is little work, however, trying to explain the heterogeneity of individuals' expectations, how they learn from new information, and the implications of this heterogeneity for market outcomes. This paper …lls some of that gap.
We propose a model where agents provide in ‡ation forecasts based on observable information -such as the previous in ‡ation rates -and unobservable information, and study how they update their beliefs. Our model improves upon previous work by including idiosyncratic heterogeneity In reduced-form regressions, we do …nd empirical support for this kind of learning. We …nd, for example, that during the 1980s -a period of high in ‡ation -young respondents provide one-year ahead in ‡ation expectations that are about 1.7 percentage points higher than those of older respondents; this is what one would expect to see if in fact expectations were based on experiences.
Inclusion of heterogeneous life experiences of in ‡ation allows us to measure both heterogeneity of expectations and the e¤ect of new information on agents'predictions. It is important to note that estimates from aggregate time series are biased, when individuals have di¤erent information sets (Keane and Runkle, 1990) . Our model estimates show that individuals are highly heterogeneous in their expectations of in ‡ation and di¤er in how quickly they update their information. In particular, women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents are slower to update their expectations, giving a larger focus to previous life experience rather than to most recent events. These groups are also less likely to change their idiosyncratic private beliefs in the following semesters, and they also have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their private beliefs. The same demographic groups -women and less educated agents -have been found in the literature to report higher in ‡ation expectations and to be less informed about objective measures of in ‡ation. 2 A possible explanation for our …nding could be that these demographic groups have di¤erent in ‡ation experiences. However, we get qualitatively similar results if we use group-speci…c in ‡ation series that take into account demographic di¤erences in expenditures and prices, suggesting that the di¤erences in updating and learning that we …nd are not primarily a result of di¤erent in ‡ation experiences, but instead indicative of di¤erent information processing rules. 3 Furthermore, we show that these features of heterogeneity across demographic groups and their dynamic updating explain a much larger component of agents' expectations than previous alternative explanations, such as rational or adaptive expectations. We also re-estimate our updating model, allowing for the coe¢ cients to vary over time in order to control for changes in the macro-environment. We …nd that, over the years, the heterogeneity of expectations for both short-term and long-term in ‡ation has decreased substantially, which is consistent with studies that …nd in ‡ation has become easier to predict in recent times (Stock and Watson, 2007) .
The Michigan survey also collects data on subjective income growth rates of respondents. We use an updating model similar to that for updating of in ‡ation expectations to model the revision of income growth expectations. We …nd that young and more educated households have greater heterogeneity of personal income growth forecasts, consistent with the larger dispersion in their observable earnings (Attanasio et al., 1999; Katz and Autor, 1999) . As with in ‡ation expectations, we …nd a decrease in the heterogeneity of personal income growth forecasts over time, consistent with the evidence that the change in the earnings'structure was largely predictable to individual agents (Primiceri and van Rens, 2009 ). Policy-makers are always concerned about the vicious cycle of in ‡ation expectations feeding into wage demands. We do …nd that, over the period 1978-1985, households incorporated a great degree of their in ‡ation forecasts in their income growth expectations. However, this tendency decreased after 1985 and in the 2000's there is no longer an e¤ect of in ‡ation expectations on income growth forecasts.
We also relate heterogeneity in in ‡ation expectations to realization of future in ‡ation. Models where consumers search for "best-bargains" show that heterogeneity of price expectations leads …rms to charge higher prices (Benabou and Gertner, 1993) . Heterogeneous information observed by consumers and slow updating of new information increases the monopoly power of …rms, since there will be a higher mass of consumers accepting to buy at high prices. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the statistical relation between in ‡ation and the inter-decile range of in ‡ation expectations in the Michigan survey data . We also test wether the estimated measure of sticky expectations obtained from our model of price updating could cause in ‡ation, since …rms may be slower to change prices when consumers are slow to update their information set. We show that the heterogeneity of new idiosyncratic information and "sticky expectations" by consumers are statistically signi…cant in explaining the next quarter's in ‡ation, which lends empirical support to the negative e¤ects of uncertainty and heterogeneous information on …rm competition and price mark-ups.
Previous literature on in ‡ation expectations has studied possible explanations for the heterogeneity of agents' beliefs. Souleles (2004) and Anderson (2008) …nd that females, racial minorities, and lower income persons have larger forecast errors than average. Souleles (2004) exploits the panel dimension of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and shows that expectations of consumer sentiment are biased and that forecast errors tend to be systematically heterogeneous and correlated with demographic characteristics. This systematic heterogeneity in forecast errors turns out to be important in explaining the excess sensitivity of household expenditure to sentiment data. Anderson (2008) , as in the current paper, focuses on in ‡ation expectations of households and exploits the panel dimension of the Michigan Survey of Consumers to study learning and accuracy of households' in ‡ation expectations. While the goal of this paper is somewhat similar to ours, the two use di¤erent updating rules. Anderson (2008) uses an adaptive learning model and focuses on forecast accuracy. We use heterogeneous lifetime experiences (of in ‡ation) in individuals'updating process and estimate a structural model of belief-updating, and link the heterogeneity in updating to market outcomes. Other studies look at the (cross-sectional) heterogeneity of in ‡ation forecasts and explain it as a result of di¤erent lifetime in ‡ation experiences (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011a) , switching between di¤erent prediction rules (Branch, 2004 (Branch, , 2007 , or rational inattention (Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers, 2003) . We show that while the …t of our model is similar to adaptive and rational expectation models when explaining the conditional mean of in ‡ation expectations, our model vastly outperforms these models when trying to explain the other conditional moments of the expectations distribution, i.e., the heterogeneity in expectations and the individual updating between di¤erent time periods. This paper is divided as follows. Section 2 discusses our model of expectations formation and outlines how we deal with both observable information and unobservable idiosyncratic beliefs. Section 3 summarizes the Michigan survey data and the historical in ‡ation series we use in our work, and shows descriptive demographic patterns in the data. Section 4 discusses the results of the updating model described in Section 2 and analyzes di¤erences in learning rules across demographic groups. In Section 5 we relate the e¤ects of heterogeneous expectations and slow learning about new information to the pricing evolution of consumer goods, using a search model framework. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of the results and proposals for future research.
2 The model of expectation updating
Basic model
We denote p t 0 ;i (t) as the prediction for the annualized in ‡ation observed at quarter t 0 t that agent i makes in quarter t. We assume agent i of cohort s learns about future in ‡ation by using previous in ‡ation experiences lived in his lifetime, lif e t;s ( ) (as in Malmendier and Nagel, 2011a), and other public information available to everyone, z t 0 (t). Lifetime in ‡ation experience can be thought as a weighted average of observed in ‡ation rates in the previous life of the agent, with more recent experiences slowly adding to older ones. In this case public information can include all contemporary information generally known to the public, such as the last reported in ‡ation rate. To simplify, let us assume a linear updating model for future in ‡ation expectations based on lif e t;s ( ) and z t 0 (t):
where denotes the importance attached to lifetime in ‡ation experiences, and p t 0 ;i (t) is idiosyncractic private information. That is, agents' expectations are assumed to depend on lifetime in ‡ation experience and private information. Note that while in ‡ation is an aggregate event, there could be several sources of private information a¤ecting individual agents' predictions. One, could be, for instance, how frequently agents read economic and …nancial news, if at all. Other examples could be how often the household head goes to the supermarket and notices price changes. Other factors can also be thought as privately observed. Poorer households are more likely to be aware of rent and food price in ‡ation, while richer households should arguably be more aware of prices of durable and luxury goods. Older households could be more aware of health costs. Since the sources of private information di¤er markedly across households of di¤erent background, it is reasonable to assume that p t 0 ;i (t) is heteroskedastic. Our model assumes that the heteroskedasticity of private information changes both across demographic groups and time, since it is possible that households change their information sources over time.
We assume the idiosyncratic private information term, The model of expectation updating is therefore quite parsimonious and depends only on a vector of four parameters: $ f ; ; ; 2 u i (t 0 t)).
Estimation
To study the heterogeneity and updating of in ‡ation expectations we use the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumer Expectations. In this survey respondents give, for two consecutive semesters, their subjective expectations of in ‡ation in the next 12 months and in ‡ation for the next 5-10 years.
The Michigan data has several demographic characteristics which allow us to measure observable heterogeneity in expectations updating across di¤erent groups. The empirical model therefore includes a vector of individual demographic characteristics, x i , which will include income, education, race, and gender. Therefore we consider heterogeneity in average expectations by allowing the model to di¤er across x i , i.e.: $ = $(x i ).
To estimate this model we assume a parametric form for the public information observed by rational agents, z t 0 (t):
where t 1 is the in ‡ation observed in the previous quarter and t 0 is the actual in ‡ation rate observed in the future (which could be partially known by a signal observed by forward-looking rational agents). d t is a dummy variable for the half-decade period in which the in ‡ation forecast is being made. Therefore, z t 0 (t) allows us to measure how much agents approach the ideal rational agent. If agents are perfectly rational then the coe¢ cient of t 0 should be close to one, while the others should be close to zero.
A problem in the empirical model is that our observed panel only includes individuals for two periods distanced by six months. Therefore one cannot deal with the …rst period error term as an AR(1). We solve this by specifying the …rst period error term to be a purely idiosyncratic term p t 0 ;i (t) = u 1 t 0 ;i (t) and using the AR(1) process,
, in the second period. This gives us two variance terms to estimate, 2 4 . We also consider parametric forms for $ = $(x i;t ):
3.2) is a constant scalar, 4 Another option is to impose
, which is the steady-state variance for someone with a(i) quarters of age. Assuming this form has no qualitative di¤erences in our results. We prefer to report the two variance terms for each panel period due to its simplicity.
3.3) = exp( x i;t ),
where x i;t fFemale, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Young, Middle-aged, low-income, middle-income, years of education, half-decade, t 1 ; j t 1 t 2 jg. For the case of the heterogeneity in in ‡ation expectations, we also allow 2 u i (t 0 t) to depend on the in ‡ation change observed in the previous period, since previous studies …nd that individuals are more uncertain in periods of high and volatile in ‡ation rates (Rich and Tracy, 2006 ).
Data
The Michigan Survey of Consumer Expectations has been conducted monthly by the University of We also use long-term historical data on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) collected by Robert Shiller on his website. Based on this long time series we calculate the quarterly in ‡ation rates observed in the US. Then we estimate the average lifetime in ‡ation experienced by each birth cohort using a quarterly update interval for several values of . The updating rule considered in 2.3.2) is highly non-linear in the in ‡ation rates of previous periods and the age of the respondents, requiring the algorithm to go over all the life in ‡ation rates of each agent and compute a di¤erent weight for each period. To reduce the computation burden of this exercise we computed the life in ‡ation series at 40 di¤erent values of and then used a linear interpolation rule to compute the life in ‡ation at intermediate values. 5 According to Judd (1998) , approximating a function through linear interpolation between points gives consistent and shape-preserving estimates of the true function as the number of evaluation points increases to in…nity. It is fundamentally required that the number of evaluation points exceeds the number of unknown parameters of the objective function. Since we use 40 points to approximate a function of one unknown parameter, it is reasonable to expect that the approximation error is small. There is a correlation of 99.99% between adjacent series of around 2.2 and 2.3, which represent the most likely values for this parameter. The correlation between life in ‡ation at adjacent points is high, therefore there is little measurement error involved in this approximation.
Descriptive analysis
Before estimation of the updating model described in Section 2, we show some descriptive patterns in the data. We retain the full sample for this purpose and do not restrict to the respondents who are re-surveyed. Figure 1 shows the median one-year ahead in ‡ation expectations in the Michigan survey. Compared to realized one-year ahead in ‡ation the median underestimates the realized in ‡ation up to the early 1990s. After that the median expectation slightly overestimates the realized in ‡ation. The visual depiction of the two series suggests that in ‡ation expectations lag behind realized in ‡ation, i.e., they seem to be anchored to realized in ‡ation in the survey year. The …gure also reports the 25th and 75th percentiles of the expectations distributions. The inter-quantile range -a measure of respondents'disagreement -is quite large. Though the range is larger in periods of high in ‡ation, the inter-quantile range is about 5% even in periods of low in ‡ation. This indicates substantial heterogeneity in point forecasts of survey respondents.
To shed light on the correlates of in ‡ation expectations, we regress the respondents' point forecast of one-year ahead in ‡ation onto a set of demographic variables in Table 1 In columns (2) and (7) of Table 1 , we include the annual rate of in ‡ation prevalent at the time of the survey as well as the realized one-year ahead in ‡ation (the quantity for which the respondent provides a forecast) as regressors along with the demographic variables. The coe¢ cient on current in ‡ation is about 0.4, while the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on one-year ahead in ‡ation is less than 0.1. This suggests that respondents are closer to adaptive expectations than to rational expectations.
Since both the in ‡ation target as well as the US economy has changed since the early 80s, in columns (3)-(5) of the table, we restrict the sample to each of the decades. What stands out is that the disparity in forecasts by demographic variables is not constant over time. For example, the coe¢ cient on females in 2000s is nearly half that in the earlier decades. Similarly, the disparity by race and ethnicity is smaller in the 2000s. The most notable estimate is that of the younger respondents. In the 1980s the mean estimate of the younger agents was 1.69 percentage points higher than that of the older respondents. This disparity had decreased to 0.768 in the 1990s, and by the 2000s the young were making predictions statistically similar to those of the old. This pattern is consistent with our learning-from-experience updating model outlined in Section 2, which posits that individuals are more strongly in ‡uenced by data realized during their lifetimes than by other historical data. Because the 80s was a period of high in ‡ation (Figure 1 ), it makes sense that the young report higher point forecasts in that period, since they should rely to a greater extent on extrapolation of recent in ‡ation data if they form expectations based on experience. Table 2 shows the heterogeneity by observables in updating of one-year ahead in ‡ation expectations.
The …rst six columns regress the absolute change in point forecasts between the two surveys onto a set of demographic and other control variables. Column (1) shows that females, minorities, young, lower-income, and less-educated agents make larger absolute revisions. These are the same demographic groups that report larger in ‡ation forecasts and therefore have more to learn in order to approach less biased expectations. Column (2) of the table includes the absolute error in the respondent's forecast (de…ned as the absolute gap between the respondent's point forecast of one-year ahead in ‡ation and actual realized one-year ahead in ‡ation) and the realized change in in ‡ation between the two surveys as additional regressors. Parameter estimates on both these regressors are positive and statistically signi…cant, i.e., respondents who have worse forecasts in the …rst survey tend to make larger revisions, and respondents revise their beliefs more during periods of more variable in ‡ation. Columns (3)- (5) of the table report the OLS estimates for each of the decades separately. Over time the heterogeneity in absolute revisions by demographics has decreased substantially, but continues to be statistically di¤erent from zero.
The last two columns report the OLS estimates of a regression of the absolute error in the respondent's point forecast for one-year ahead in ‡ation in each of the two surveys. Column (6) shows that the demographic groups who report larger point forecasts and revise more between the two surveys -females, minorities, young, the less wealthy and the less educated -also make larger forecast errors. The last column shows that, even when interviewed the second time, error patterns by demographics look similar. We include the respondent's absolute error in the …rst survey as an explanatory variable in this speci…cation. The estimates show a positive relationship between the absolute error in the …rst survey and the error in the second survey, i.e., there is persistence in forecast errors of respondents. These results are consistent with Souleles (2004) and Anderson (2008) who also …nd that females, racial minorities, and low income respondents make larger forecast errors than average.
Why is it that certain demographic groups report larger point forecasts, make larger forecast errors, and revise more? It could be that females, lower income individuals, less educated, young, and minorities have di¤erent actual in ‡ation experiences and hence report larger point forecasts.
Also, groups facing more volatile in ‡ation rates could show less persistence in their in ‡ation expectations. However, we …nd that this explanation is unlikely and should play a minor role.
The Chicago Fed IBEX 12 month in ‡ation series 6 Other possible explanations for demographic di¤erences in in ‡ation expectations include di¤erent expectations formation and information-processing rules. More speci…cally, there could either be demographic di¤erences in heterogeneity of private information, or the speed at which di¤erent groups update their in ‡ation expectations. Heterogenous updating of expectations has implications for steady-state in ‡ation, …scal de…cits, and asset savings, and understanding the underlying channels is important for e¤ective monetary policy. We next explore sources of demographic di¤erences in updating explicitly in our model. 4 Interpreting the heterogeneity of prediction rules
Short-term in ‡ation forecasts
We estimate the model of equations 2.1) and 2.2) by Maximum Likelihood 8 , using agents'forecasts at 1 year and 5-10 year horizons. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the empirical results for in ‡ation expectations at the 1 year horizon.
The …rst two columns of Table 3 show the estimated coe¢ cients and standard errors for the mean expectations process, z t 0 (t), for , and for the 1-year horizon. The model clearly rejects the hypothesis of rational expectations. This can be concluded by the estimated coe¢ cient for future one-year ahead in ‡ation being close to zero, while the coe¢ cient for the in ‡ation lag being close to 0.5. Therefore households are closer to adaptive expectations than to rational expectations. From estimates of , it is also clear that women, ethnic minorities, lower income, and less educated agents are slower to update their expectations, since they give more importance to lifetime in ‡ation. Our Table 4 show that women, ethnic minorities, lower income, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their expectations (i.e., larger estimates of log( 2 u i )). The data also shows that there is a higher dispersion (or disagreement) in the in ‡ation predictions of households in periods of higher in ‡ation and more volatile in ‡ation (as measured by the absolute change of in ‡ation in the previous two quarters). We also …nd that Asians, Hispanics, and higher educated persons are slower to update their idiosyncratic opinions on in ‡ation.
In Panel A of Table 5 we show how the heterogeneity has evolved over the years through the dummies for each half-decade. It is evident that the heterogeneity of in ‡ation forecasts has decreased signi…cantly over the years, particularly since the early 80s. This result is consistent with the evidence shown by Stock and Watson (2007) , who …nd that in ‡ation has been easier to forecast in the last two decades. However, the heterogeneity of in ‡ation expectations has increased since 2005, perhaps as a consequence of the greater uncertainty due to the economic crisis.
Economists often worry that the degree of persistence of in ‡ation shocks depends on how much expectations incorporate changes in the previous in ‡ation rates (Orphanides and Williams, 2003) .
Our model estimates suggest that the lagged in ‡ation term, t 1 , is the most important determinant of in ‡ation expectations. Therefore it is interesting to see how much the e¤ect of past in ‡ation has changed future in ‡ation expectations over di¤erent periods and policy regimes. Next, we re-estimate our model but with the coe¢ cient for the lagged in ‡ation term changing at each half-decade. The evidence in Panel B of Table 5 suggests that households, in the 2000's, condition more strongly their expectations on the previously observed in ‡ation. Again, this result is consistent with the …ndings of Stock and Watson (2007) , who show that the use of the last observed in ‡ation in the economic models'forecasts has increased substantially in the last decade.
Long-term in ‡ation forecasts
Now we comment on the results for the expectations at a 5 year-horizon. In general the results are qualitatively similar to those at the 1 year horizon. The last quarterly in ‡ation is a positive determinant of the 5-10 year in ‡ation expectations (last two columns of Table 3 ). We also …nd that women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents are slower to update their expectations and attach more importance to lifetime in ‡ation. Again, our estimate of the life in ‡ation update velocity is 2.68, which di¤ers from the value of 1.889 estimated by Malmendier and Nagel (2011a). The fact that agents attach a positive value to the last quarter's in ‡ation in their long-term expectations is an important result. The coe¢ cient of 0.14 for previous in ‡ation in the long-term expectations is smaller than the 0.48 coe¢ cient for the one year horizon, indicating that agents do expect recent in ‡ation shocks to die out as time passes. However, agents expect that part of the recent shock will be persistent even after 5 years. In general, due to the high persistence in price formation, one should expect that shocks to in ‡ation a¤ect expectations of short-term expectations.
However, if agents believe that central banks have a credible target rate for in ‡ation, last quarter's in ‡ation should not explain long-term in ‡ation expectations.
We also used the mean in ‡ation of 5-10 years in the future ( t+4 10;t+4 5 ) and 5-10 years in the past ( t 4 10;t 4 5 ) as regressors. However, neither previous long-term in ‡ation or future long-term in ‡ation is signi…cant. The fact that future long term in ‡ation rates do not a¤ect current long-term in ‡ation expectations implies that agents are again rejected to be rational.
Also, heterogeneity within each demographic group is qualitatively similar to the expectations of in ‡ation at 1 year horizon (lower panel of Table 4 ). Again we …nd that women, ethnic minorities, younger persons, lower income, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their expectations. The data also show that there is a higher dispersion (or disagreement) in the in ‡ation predictions of households in periods of higher in ‡ation. However, the persistence of long-term in ‡ation expectations behaves di¤erently than in the short-term. Here, we …nd that females, Asians and Blacks are quicker to update their idiosyncratic opinions on in ‡ation. We also show how the heterogeneity has evolved over the years through the dummies for each half-decade (Table 5) . Again, it is clear that the heterogeneity of in ‡ation forecasts decreased signi…cantly over the years, and that the heterogeneity of in ‡ation expectations has increased since 2005.
It is also noticeable that lower income agents have a higher heterogeneity of expectations both at short-term (top panel of Table 4 ) and long-term horizons (bottom panel of Table 4 ). This result …ts well with previous research that …nds lower income agents have poorer forecasts (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003). However, another potential explanation for this is that lower income households consume di¤erent consumption baskets and may have a higher consumption share in items, such as food, that have more volatile prices at both the local level and at di¤erent time periods (Pollak, 1980; Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers, 2003). We test for this second possibility by using the Chicago Fed IBEX 12 month in ‡ation rate instead of the CPI. As described earlier, the IBEX is a monthly in ‡ation measure designed to capture the in ‡ation experiences of speci…c socioeconomic and demographic groups. Using this alternate in ‡ation series does not change our results qualitatively, indicating that di¤erent in ‡ation experiences cannot explain our results (results not reported here; available from the authors upon request).
Again, it is also interesting to see how the e¤ect of past in ‡ation on long-term in ‡ation expectations has changed over di¤erent periods and policy regimes. Next, we re-estimate the updating model allowing for the coe¢ cient for the lagged in ‡ation term to change at each decade and half-decade. We show the coe¢ cients for each half-decade in Panel B of Table 5 . The evidence seems to point out that American households, during the late 1980s and the 2000s, did not incorporate short-term ‡uctuations in the previous in ‡ation rate in their long-term in ‡ation expectations. This is interesting, because it suggests that people were slow to react to the credibility of the new regime imposed by Volcker in the early 1980s. It is also a sign that consumers during the 2000's trust the ability of the Federal Reserve to revert short-term in ‡ation ‡uctuations over the long term.
Personal income growth forecasts
Economists are often worried that in ‡ation expectations could a¤ect wage demands. We explore this issue by studying how the personal income growth point forecasts of the households in the next year relate to their in ‡ation expectations. The …rst two columns of Table 6 regress the subjective income growth expectation reported in the …rst and second surveys on various demographic variables and controls, respectively. Few notable patterns stand out. Mean income growth expectations (as indicated by the constant terms) are negative. The young and middle-age respondents report economically and statistically signi…cant large positive (or smaller negative) income growth expectations.
The elasticity of income growth expectations with respect to in ‡ation expectations is 0.030.
While it is fairly inelastic, the coe¢ cient is very precise, suggesting that respondents do perceive a positive link between wage ‡uctuations and in ‡ation. The third column of the table reports the OLS estimates of the regression of the change in income growth expectations on demographics; we …nd that, except for the Young dummy, no demographic variable is statistically signi…cant. Since we are interested in the magnitude of revisions, the last two columns report the estimates of the absolute change in income expectations on the various covariates. Low income and young respondents revise their income expectations more-this could be the result of their labor market experiences being more volatile. The last column shows that absolute revisions in income expectations, while positively correlated with absolute revisions of in ‡ation expectations, are not correlated with realized changes in in ‡ation between the surveys. That is, respondents rely more on changes in their subjective in ‡ation forecasts than in actual changes in in ‡ation between surveys.
We next estimate the same model as described in section 2 for the forecasts of personal income growth (i.e., now using income growth forecasts as the dependent variable instead of in ‡ation expectations). However, we now use the subjective in ‡ation expectation of the household for the next year, Tables 7 and 8 . It is noticeable that, in both periods, agents' personal income growth forecasts rely more on their subjective in ‡ation expectations than on the past in ‡ation (Table 7) , especially in the …rst period forecast. This is similar to our …nding in the reduced-form regressions reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 . This makes a strong case for central banks to contain in ‡ation expectations, since the estimates imply that rises in in ‡ation expectations are tied to an expected increase in wages. Our model estimates also show that males, low and middle income, and more educated households rely more on their lifetime in ‡ation experience than others (i.e., higher estimates of ). The data also shows that there is a higher dispersion in the personal income growth forecasts during periods of higher in ‡ation volatility, although there is lower dispersion in forecasts during periods of higher in ‡ation (Table   8 ).
It is also noticeable that young, middle-aged, low and middle income, and highly educated households have a higher heterogeneity of personal income growth forecasts than the average (Table 8) . This is consistent with the life-cycle evidence. Most of the heterogeneity in the trend growth of personal income happens early in life (Attanasio et al., 1999) . Moreover, evidence on the inequality of work earnings shows that the highly educated workers are the ones with more intra-group heterogeneity (Katz and Autor, 1999). Also, females, young and middle-aged, middle income, and highly educated households update their expectations more quickly (Table 8 ). This result makes sense since young and more educated households are the ones that have more to learn about the prospects of their future jobs. In Panel A of Table 9 , we show how the heterogeneity has evolved over the years through dummies for each half-decade. It is clear that the heterogeneity of personal income growth forecasts decreased signi…cantly over the years. This result is consistent with the evidence found by Primiceri and van Rens (2009), who …nd that the increases in earnings' inequality over the last 25 years was the result of predictable changes in earnings.
We also experimented with using the actual realized in ‡ation in the next year as a regressor instead of using the household's in ‡ation expectation, but the results were qualitatively similar. The model with the actual future in ‡ation as a regressor, however, had a signi…cantly lower log-likelihood and therefore provided a worse …t for the data. This result makes sense, since it is reasonable to expect households to rely more on their subjective in ‡ation forecast when forming their expectations for their own personal income growth. We also saw evidence consistent with this in the last column of Table 6 .
Again, it is interesting to see how the relationship between in ‡ation expectations and income growth expectations has changed over di¤erent periods and policy regimes. Next, we re-estimate the model, allowing for the coe¢ cient for the in ‡ation expectation term to change at each decade and half-decade. We show the coe¢ cients for each half-decade in Panel B of Table 9 
Model Fit
As we discussed before, several explanations and models have been o¤ered to explain the evolution of in ‡ation expectations and its heterogeneity, including: a) rational expectations, b) adaptive expectations, and c) di¤erent life experiences. In relation to the previous alternatives in the literature, our model includes heterogeneity in the use of information both in terms of observable information (demographic groups attach di¤erent importance to their lifetime experiences and have di¤erent bias for their expectations) and unobservable information (people update information di¤erently with some groups being "faster learners" than others). Therefore we can think of our model as essentially a model with heterogeneous information and dynamic updating features. This model is the equivalent of assuming people never update their expectations with time-varying information and that heterogeneity of expectations does not di¤er across demographic groups or over di¤erent years. Another way to think about these two metrics is that the Efron's R-square considers only deviations from the mean, while the Pseudo R-square cares about how the model …ts the whole probability distribution. In the case of the bivariate normal in our model, that translates into how well the model's three parameters -the mean, variance, and the correlation between the private information in the two periods -…t the entire joint distribution of the data.
We compute both the (Efron's) R-square and the Pseudo R-square for a model that also includes the information of future in ‡ation in the next period, i.e., a purely forward-looking model. This model di¤ers from rational expectations, because it considers that agents can be systematically biased and therefore there could be a signi…cant constant di¤erentiating expectations from future in ‡ation. Therefore we can think of this alternative as a biased rational expectations model. We also report these statistics for a model that includes both a constant and the in ‡ation rate observed in the last quarter, which can be thought of as a model of biased adaptive expectations, since it includes the possibility that a persistent bias could di¤erentiate mean expectations from past in ‡ation. Finally, we consider a model that allows for a constant and the individual lifetime in ‡ation rate, as suggested by Malmendier and Nagel (2011a).
The R-squares and Pseudo R-squares of our model and its three alternatives are shown in Table   10 . We focus on the R-square and Pseudo R-square of the models computed for the agents within the 25th and 75th percentiles of in ‡ation expectations for both the 1 year and 5-10 years horizons and the personal income expectations for the next year. We choose to do this because parametric likelihood models are better at explaining the center of the distribution than their tails. In the case of in ‡ation expectations, there are a considerable number of individuals reporting in ‡ation rates far from the historical experience of the last 35 years and those predictions are hard to explain by any economic model. Therefore, focusing on the population closer to the center of the distribution insures our analysis is not plagued by outliers.
Based on the Efron's R-square, shown in the …rst three columns of Table 10 , we see that our model does slightly better than the alternatives for each of the three expectations, in particular for 1-year ahead in ‡ation expectations, in explaining deviations from the mean. Amongst the alternatives, all three models perform equally well. However, our model has a much higher Pseudo R-square value than any of the alternatives. It is quite striking that these other models explain only a very small part of the individual-level heterogeneity of in ‡ation predictions and the updating process between the …rst and second periods.
So, overall, all these models do a similar job in explaining the mean value of in ‡ation expectations. However, our model di¤ers a lot in how much of the heterogeneity it explains. This result con…rms that demographic heterogeneity and di¤erences in dynamic updating of information are an essential characteristic of in ‡ation expectations.
Implications for market outcomes

E¤ects of heterogeneity and sticky expectations on in ‡ation
The heterogeneity and persistence (or "stickiness") of in ‡ation expectations should have strong e¤ects on macroeconomic equilibrium. There are several search models where consumers look around for a good deal and decide whether to trade or not (Diamond, 1987; Benabou and Gertner, 1993 ). Benabou and Gertner (1993) show that cost uncertainty reduces the informativeness of prices by scrambling relative and aggregate variations. But if agents can become better informed, price competition will intensify. This is a similar intuition to that in the literature on learning and asset prices, where several researchers have found that the higher heterogeneity of opinions among agents creates an option price feature to the asset which translates into a price-drift (Harris and Raviv, 1993, Sims, 2009 ).
Here we stick to a framework similar to Benabou and Gertner (1993), but with major simpli…cations in order to illustrate the simple point of how consumers'information heterogeneity on prices a¤ects the price level set by …rms. We posit a very simple search model, where buyers accept to buy a product from a store depending on how they think the overall price distribution is. Assume that a store with an homogeneous and indivisible product is trying to set its optimal price, p. Customers will buy its product if p is below their subjective reserve price, p i , which is heterogeneously distributed, with cdf F (p i ), depending on the private information about what the overall price for this product in the economy is, and whether p is a good-bargain or not. Therefore, the store maximizes its pro…t function given by:
In this model, when there is heterogeneous information observed by consumers on the upper side of the distribution, this increases the monopoly power of …rms, since there will be a higher We now test the predictions of this simple framework, using our learning model estimated from the Michigan survey data. To measure heterogeneity of consumer expectations, we use the panel data nature of our model to obtain two measures of heterogeneity. The …rst measure of heterogeneity measures the variance of current in ‡ation forecasts. We use the inter-decile range of the in ‡ation forecasts of the 2nd round interviews, IDR( p t+4;i (t)), as a measure of current heterogeneity in in ‡ation expectations, which is denoted as heterogeneity t . We also include one measure of sticky expectations, the median i , which we denote as sticky i;t . The variable i shows how slow agents are to update their idiosyncratic expectations term and documents changes in these expectations over time. Our results are qualitatively similar if we use the the mean value of i instead of the median.
We run a regression of next quarter in ‡ation on median[ p t+4;i (t)], heterogeneity t , and sticky i;t . We also condition our regression on other variables a¤ecting in ‡ation, such as in ‡ation of the previous quarter, t 1 , and the in ‡ation volatility in the last semester, j t 1 t 2 j. The results for the e¤ects of the expectations at one year horizon and …ve-to-ten years on the next quarter's in ‡ation are shown in the two panels of Table 11 . It is easy to verify that both heterogeneity t and sticky i;t are highly signi…cant in explaining the in ‡ation in the next quarter, for both horizons. It is also noticeable that median in ‡ation expectation, median[ p t+4;i (t)], has no discernible e¤ect on future in ‡ation. Therefore, using only median/mean expectations and ignoring the heterogeneity and persistence of idiosyncratic beliefs neglects important information.
Conclusions
We propose a model where agents provide in ‡ation forecasts based on observable information -such as the previous in ‡ation rates -and unobservable information. In our model, upon receipt of new information, agents may update both the public information as well as their private information.
Using the panel data of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we show that individuals are highly heterogeneous in their updating of in ‡ation expectations. However, over the years, the heterogeneity of expectations for both short-term and long-term in ‡ation has decreased substantially. Also, in the recent decades, agents rely more on previous observed in ‡ation to forecast future in ‡ation rates.
This result is consistent with studies that …nd in ‡ation and earnings' structure became easier to predict more recently (Stock and Watson, 2007) .
During the 2000's, the previous period in ‡ation rate matters more for the one-year horizon in ‡ation forecast than for long-term in ‡ation expectations. This shows that although contemporary consumers expect in ‡ation to be more persistent in the short-term, there is a greater con…dence in the ability of the Federal Reserve to revert those shocks over the long term. In a similar way, personal income forecasts during the 2000's are less sensitive to subjective in ‡ation expectations, i.e., the interplay between wages and in ‡ation -a common feature of the wage-in ‡ation spiral of the 1970s -has diminished in the last decade.
One notable …nding is that individuals di¤er in how quickly they update their expectations of in ‡ation. In particular, women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents are slower to update their expectations, giving a larger focus to previous life experience rather than to recent events.
These groups are also less prone to change their idiosyncratic private beliefs in the following semesters. This slowness in the updating of new information could explain why these groups systematically report inaccurate expectations. Finally, we relate how learning about in ‡ation and belief heterogeneity is related to market equilibrium of consumer goods and …nancial markets.
We show that the heterogeneity of new idiosyncratic information and "sticky expectations" by consumers can increase the next quarter's in ‡ation. This evidence is consistent with models where consumers search for "best-bargains" (Benabou and Gertner, 1993 ).
However, our most important result is that our model vastly outperforms other models in explaining the heteroskedasticity and updating of agents' expectations. Expectation di¤erences across agents are large and persistent over time. Demographic heterogeneity and di¤erences in dynamic updating of information are therefore an essential characteristic of in ‡ation expectations and the most salient feature observed over the last three decades of expectations data.
This conclusion is relevant for improvements in future macro modelling of agents'reactions, since it shows heterogeneity is a much more essential feature of the data than the dichotomy between rational expectations versus backward looking expectations or adaptive updating. Recent research has shown that several structural macro models may not have a stable equilibrium when there is heterogeneity of in ‡ation expectations and updating (Giannitsarou, 2003; Honkapohja and Mitra, 2006 ). This implies that standard monetary policy will not be able to make in ‡ation converge to the best possible outcome (Orphanides and Williams, 2003) . Also, heterogeneous learning dynamics imply that monetary and …scal policy has di¤erent e¤ects on agents'savings (agents that believe in higher future in ‡ation will save and invest less), as well as on the steady-state rate of government de…cits (Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon, 2001 ). Therefore, our …nding that agents' learning about in ‡ation is highly heterogeneous should have important implications for the simulation of realistic macro models and policy-making. The table reports OLS estimates of the regression of one-year ahead in ‡ation point forecast expectation on various demographics.
a Young is de…ned as age < 31; Mid-age is de…ned as age > 30 & age < 61. Standard Deviations in Parentheses. ***, **, * denote signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. OLS estimates reported of a regression onto various demographics.
Standard Deviations in Parentheses. ***, **, * denote signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. All terms include dummies for half-decade periods. Robust Huber-White standard-errors. ***, **, * denote signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. N=85350 for 1-yr horizon; N = 59371 for 5-10 yr horizon. Robust Huber-White standard-errors. ***, **, * denote signi…cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. a heterogeneity t is the inter-decile range of in ‡ation forecasts in the 2nd survey. b sticky i;t is the median i (the private information updating parameter).
